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McCarran-Ferguson Act Immunity from the
Truth in Lending Act and Title VII
The McCarran-Ferguson Act' immunizes the "business of in-
surance" from federal laws that would "invalidate, impair, or su-
persede" state regulation. This immunity has been most frequently
invoked in the context of antitrust litigation.' The statute is
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976). The statutory language provides in part:
§ 1011
The Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part
of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxa-
tion of such business by the several States.
§ 1012
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the
laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as
amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to
the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
2 In the academic commentary, the focus has been on the proviso holding the Sherman,
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts "applicable to the business of insurance to the
extent that such business is not regulated by State law." The major issues raised by this
proviso have been the scope of the term "business of insurance" and the level of state regu-
lation required to trigger the McCarran-Ferguson exemption. See Note, The Definition of
"Business of Insurance" Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act After Royal Drug, 80 COLUM.
L. Rav. 1475 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]; Comment, Federal Regulation of
Insurance Companies: The Disappearing McCarran Act Exemption, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1340
[hereinafter cited as Duke Comment]; Note, Qualified Immunity for Insurers Under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 396 (1978) [hereinafter cited as George
Washington Note]; Comment, The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemption for "The Business
of Insurance". A Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REv. 329 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Tennessee Comment]; Comment, State Regulation Under the McCarran Act, 47 TuL. L.
REv. 1069 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tulane Comment]. The literature on the McCarran-
Ferguson Act's antitrust implications is voluminous. See generally Hanson, The Interplay
of the Regimes of Antitrust, Competition and State Insurance Regulation of the Business
of Insurance, 28 DRAKE: L. REv. 767 (1979); National Institute Proceedings: Application of
Antitrust Law to the Business of Insurance, 13 FORUM 867 (1978); Nedrow, The McCarran
Controversy: Insurance and the Antitrust Law, 12 CONN. L. Rxv. 205 (1980); Stern, The
McCarran Act 20 Years After, 1966 INs. L.J. 605; Comment, The McCarran-Ferguson Act:
A Time for Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAD. L. REv. 1271 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Van-
derbilt Comment].
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broadly worded, however, and extends the immunity of the insur-
ance industry beyond the antitrust context to all other areas of
federal regulation not specifically aimed at the "business of insur-
ance."' Despite this broad grant of immunity, courts often have
been reluctant to give full effect to the plain language of the stat-
ute when parties have sought to invoke McCarran-Ferguson immu-
nity in areas other than antitrust. This comment examines and
criticizes the interpretation that courts have given the McCarran-
Ferguson Act in two significant nonantitrust contexts: cases arising
under the Truth in Lending Act' and under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.'
The comment first reviews the legislative history of the stat-
ute, which indicates that while Congress generally intended to
grant the insurance industry a comprehensive exemption from fed-
eral regulation, it failed to delineate the scope of this exemption.
Next, it analyzes the interpretation that has been given to the
phrase "the business of insurance" in cases arising under the
Truth in Lending Act and Title VII, concluding that some courts
have impermissibly narrowed the range of activities covered under
this term. The comment also analyzes judicial interpretations of
the second requirement for McCarran-Ferguson immunity-that
the federal statute "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state law
regulating the business of insurance-and shows that courts have
not yet applied this language properly. Finally, the comment con-
cludes that the plain language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act ex-
empts the business of insurance from federal regulation in contexts
where such immunity seems undesirable because it poses an obsta-
cle to the important federal policies embodied in the Truth in
Lending Act and Title VII; if Congress did intend those statutes to
apply to the insurance industry, however, it should act to make its
intention clear.7
" Despite the broad grant of immunity in section 1012(b), see note 1 supra, certain
federal statutes are specifically exempted from the effect of the McCarran-Ferguson Act:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect in any manner the applica-
tion to the business of insurance the Act of July 5, 1935, as amended, known as the
National Labor Relations Act, or the Act of June 25, 1938, as amended, known as the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the Act of June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant
Marine Act, 1920.
15 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976). See also text and note at note 28 infra.
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
7 Statutes such as Title VII could be amended to state that they relate specifically to
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE ACT
Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 19451 in re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters AssociationY Overturning precedent,10 the
Court held that the business of insurance was within the scope of
the interstate commerce clause and thus subject to regulation
under the federal antitrust laws.11 This decision rendered the busi-
ness of insurance vulnerable to the full scope of federal regulation,
contrary to the then generally accepted principle that the insur-
the business of insurance. Alternatively, section 1014 of the Act could be amended to make
the McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity unavailable in Truth in Lending and Title VII cases.
Finally, the more drastic action of repealing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, or at least its
applicability to nonantitrust cases, is of course open to Congress.
In fact, legislation introduced in the 96th Congress would have substantially amended
the Act and restricted its effect to certain specific business practices. S. 2474, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980). Section 6(a) of S. 2474 specifically prohibits sex discrimination of the type
alleged in the Spirt and Peters cases, see text and notes at notes 83-87 infra. The general
immunity language of section 1012(b) is deleted entirely from S. 2474. See also Comment,
Potential Federal Intervention in the Insurance Industry: The Pending United States
Senate Subcommittee Draft to Amend the MeCarran-Ferguson Act, 28 DRAIM L. REV. 926
(1979).
For conflicting views on the relative advantages of federal or state regulation, compare
Kimball, The Case for State Regulation of Insurance, in INsuIRAcE, GoVERNMEr, AND So-
cIAL POLICY 411 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969) with McHugh, The Real Issue:
State versus Federal or Regulation versus Competition, in id. at 193.
The majority of the literature generated by this proposed legislation has dealt not with
the policy conflict explored in this comment but with the modification or repeal of the ex-
emption from an antitrust perspective. As to modification, see, e.g., 2 NATIONAL CoMBUssloN
FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT To THE PREsmENT AND THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL 225-52 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO THE PRESMENT]; McHugh,
The McCarran Act Shield: Its Origin, Evolution, and Future, 13 FORUM 630 (1978); Com-
ments on the Repeal or Amendment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 48 ANTrrRUST L.J. 997
(1980); Vanderbilt Comment, supra note 2. But see Hanson, The Disadvantages of Federal
Insurance Regulation as Highlighted by the Brooke Bill, 13 FORUM 605 (1978); Hanson,
supra note 2; Whiting, The Case for Retaining the Exemption, 13 FORuM 927 (1978). Con-
cerning the antitrust implications of repeal, see FEDmEAL-STATE REGULATION OF THE PRmCIN
AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE 41-64 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977); Hanson, supra note 2, at 817-
87; Joskow, Competition and Regulation in the Property/Casualty Insurance Industry, in 2
REPORT TO THE PRESmENT, supra, at 207-27.
* Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976)).
* 322 U.S. 533 (1944). The South-Eastern Underwriters Association, its membership of
nearly 200 private-stock fire insurance companies, and various individuals were indicted for
alleged violations of the Sherman Act. The indictment alleged two conspiracies: the first to
restrain and the second to monopolize interstate trade and commerce by fixing and main-
taining arbitrary and noncompetitive premium rates on fire and specified "allied lines" of
insurance in seven southern states. Id. at 534-35.
10 E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913).
" 322 U.S. at 561.
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ance industry was immune from federal regulation and subject
only to the regulation of the individual states.1"
The furor that followed the South-Eastern Underwriters deci-
sion and culminated in the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
was prompted by a variety of concerns. Proponents of the Act per-
ceived South-Eastern Underwriters as striking "at. the heart of
State sovereignty"' 3 and leading to an undesirable concentration of
power in Washington. 14 It was feared that the decision would inter-
fere with state taxation,15 broaden the reach of federal bureau-
cracy,"' and cause chaos in an industry that had developed certain
necessarily noncompetitive practices-such as cooperative rate
making-under the protective umbrella of state regulation.1 7 Insur-
ance companies were particularly concerned that the decision
could place them in a double bind. If they continued to engage in
practices such as cooperative rate making, as required by state law,
they might be subject to federal antitrust prosecution; if they
abandoned such practices, they would be violating state law.'8
Consequently, the drafters of the McCarran-Ferguson Act sought
to restore the regulatory structure of the insurance industry to its
pre-South-Eastern Underwriters status,'9 thereby honoring Con-
"2 Until the South-Eastern Underwriters decision, the insurance industry was not con-
sidered to be part of interstate commerce and thus was subject only to regulation by indi-
vidual states. Once South-Eastern Underwriters held the industry to be involved in inter-
state commerce, it was feared that the existing system of state taxation and regulation
would be held to be an unlawful restraint of interstate commerce. H.R. REP. No. 873, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 10 (1943); 90 CONG. REc. 6527-48 (1944). As some individual states de-
rived very substantial revenues from taxation of the insurance industry, there was consider-
able sentiment that the situation should be returned to pre-South-Eastern Underwriters
status. 90 CONG. REC. 6548 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Cravens). Justice Jackson, dissenting in
part in the South-Eastern Underwriters case, stated: "The Court's decision at very least
will require an extensive overhauling of state legislation relating to taxation and supervi-
sion.... Certainly the states lose very important controls and very considerable revenues."
322 U.S. at 590 (footnote omitted).
" 90 CONG. REc. 6559 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Suniners).
4 Id. at 6530 (remarks of Rep. Satterfield); id. at 6536 (remarks of Rep. Howell).
15 Id. at 6548 (remarks of Rep. Cravens).
16 H.R. REP. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1943).
17 89 CONG. REC. 10661 (1943) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
18 S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945); 90 CONG. REc. 6526 (1944) (remarks of
Rep. Walter).
19 91 CONG. Rac. 1442 (1945) (remarks of Sen. McCarran). See also Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-31 (1945). By enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress
did not completely restore the regulatory structure of the insurance industry to that existing
prior to the South-Eastern Underwriters decision. The major differences are in the anti-
trust area. Most importantly, the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that the Sherman Act
does apply to agreements or acts to "boycott, coerce, or intimidate." 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b)
19811
The University of Chicago Law Review [48:730
gress's original intention, when enacting the Sherman2 0  and
Clayton2 1  Acts, to exclude the insurance industry from their
scope.22
Even prior to the decision in South-Eastern Underwriters,
legislation that sought to preserve the insurance industry's immu-
nity from potential judicial abrogation had been introduced in
both houses of Congress.2 These early versions of the legislation
were extremely brief, providing simply that the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts were not to be construed as applicable to the business of
insurance.2 4 The final version of the legislation, introduced 25 and
(1976).
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
21 Id. §§ 12-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1976).
22 90 CONG. REc. 6524 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Walter). The decisions of the Court
indicating that the insurance business was not "commerce" apparently were known to the
Senate. During the Senate debate over the original bill introduced by Senator Sherman,
Senator Turpie, discussing the reach of the federal commerce power, stated, "I recollect one
judicial decision upon this subject very definitely. The Supreme Court has decided that
insurance is not commerce...." 21 CONG. REc. 2556 (1890). The intention of Congress in
enacting the Sherman Act and other antitrust legislation was, of course, one of the major
issues in South-Eastern Underwriters.
21 See 89 CONG. REc. 7686, 7689 (1943). During the almost two years from the time this
legislation was introduced until similar legislation was enacted into law, much attention was
focused on the progress of the legislation. It had the support of both major political parties.
The 1940 platform of the Democratic Party contained the provision: "We favor strick [sic]
supervision of'all forms of the insurance business by the several States for the protection of
policyholders and the public." Quoted in H.R. REP. No. 873, 78th Cong., lt Sess. 11 (1943).
The Republican Party platform of 1940 stated: "We condemn the New Deal attempts to
destroy the confidence of our people in private insurance institutions. We favor a continu-
ance of regulation of insurance by the several states." Quoted in id.
Neither the insurance industry, see Insurance, Joint Hearings on S. 1362, H.R. 3269,
and H.R. 3270 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Seas.
73 (1943) (testimony of Edward L. Williams, president of the Insurance Executives Associa-
tion), nor the state officials concerned with regulating the insurance industry, see S. REP.
No. 1112, pt. 2, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1944), were happy with the decision in South-
Eastern Underwriters. They felt that the structure of state taxation and regulation that had
developed to oversee one of the nation's largest industries was in danger of collapse with no
immediate alternative at hand. See H.R. RaP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1945); S.
Ran. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945). For a contemporary history, see Comment, A
Year of S.E.U.A., 23 CHi.-KENT L. Rpv. 317 (1945). For a general history, see Carlson, The
Insurance Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1127 (1979); Weller, The
McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Pol-
icy, 1978 DuKE L.J. 587.
24 H.R. 3270 and the identical S. 1362 were introduced in the first session of the 78th
Congress and provided:
That nothing contained in the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman
Act, or the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, shall be
construed to apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct of that busi-
ness or in any wise to impair the regulation of that business by the several states.
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eventually enacted" in the Seventy-Ninth Congress, was more ex-
plicit and significantly broader in scope.2 7 The comprehensive im-
munity granted by section 1012(b) of the Act was a feature of both
the Senate and House versions. Senator O'Mahoney, one of the co-
managers of the bill, endorsed a broad view of the general grant of
immunity in the Act, stating that it should be interpreted not
merely "as an additional exemption from the Antitrust laws," but
rather as a "catch-all provision to take into consideration other
acts of Congress which might affect the insurance industry, but of
which we did not have knowledge at the time."'"
The McCarran-Ferguson Act intentionally embraced the full
scope of possible federal regulation."9 It is also evident that neither
the Senate nor the House sufficiently considered the ramifications
of such an extension. In fact, the only areas to receive appreciable
attention were those that gave the primary impetus for the Act:
S. Rm. No. 1112, pt. 2, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1944). This bill passed the House, 90 CONG.
Rac. 6565 (1944), but failed to pass the Senate, 90 CONG. Rac. 8054 (1944). The bill's failure
in the Senate is attributable in part to the desire of some Senators that no legislation be
enacted before the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") (an organi-
zation of state officials who administer state insurance regulations) submitted its version of
the bill. S. REP. No. 1112, pt. 2, 78th Cong., 2d Seas. 6 (1944). See also Weller, supra note
21, at 592-93 & n.34.
11 H.R. 1973, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); S. 340, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
29 91 CONG. REc. 1085, 1396 (1945).
27 S. 340 and H.R. 1973 were modifications of the bill originally drafted by the legisla-
tive committee of the NAIC. 91 CONG. REc. 483 (1945) (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney). See
also Weller, supra note 23, at 587, 593-97.
'a 91 CONG. REc. 483 (1945). Senator O'Mahoney's remarks pertained to his bill, S. 12,
which, in fact, was more restrictive than the legislation eventually enacted by Congress.
Similarly, in the Senate debate over passage of S. 340, both Senator Ferguson and Senator
Rivercomb explicitly confirmed that the intent of the bill was to exempt the insurance in-
dustry from future federal statutes, whether they pertained to antitrust or other areas of
federal concern. Id.
Despite such explicit recognition of the broad scope of immunity contained in section
1012(b), there was no debate over this aspect of the Act. There was debate, however, over
the operational effect of the statute in the antitrust context. As a result, the conference
version of the bill that was adopted, see 91 CONG. REC. 1085, 1396 (1945), differed substan-
tially from the original Senate and House versions. Among other differences, the original
versions exempted the insurance industry from the Federal Trade Commission Act, while
the enacted conference bill made that act applicable, after a brief moratorium, to the insur-
ance industry to the extent that it was not regulated by state law. See H.R. REP. No. 213,
79th Cong., 1st Seas. 3 (1945); Weller, supra note 23, at 597 n.56.
21 A number of cases construing the Act have recognized the breadth of the immunity.
In one of the first cases to be decided following passage of the Act, the Supreme Court
stated: "Obviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and future
state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance." Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946). See also Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 463 (5th
Cir. 1979).
1981]
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state taxation and federal antitrust regulation. 0 Analysis of the
statute's application to nonantitrust areas must therefore be un-
dertaken without the benefit of expressly applicable legislative
history.
II. THE CASE LAW
The plain language of the statute indicates that a party in the
business of insurances' may claim McCarran-Ferguson immunity
from any federal regulation not specifically relating to insurance
whenever the application of federal law would "invalidate, impair,
or supersede" state law.32 Consequently, when a party attempts to
invoke McCarran-Ferguson immunity, three determinations are
necessary: (1) whether the federal statute involved "specifically re-
lates to the business of insurance"; (2) if not, whether the activity
in question is within the "business of insurance"; and (3) if so,
whether the application of federal law would "invalidate, impair,
or supersede" state law. While the first question lends itself to rel-
atively easy resolution,3 courts are in conflict over the latter two
30 Virtually all debate concerning the McCarran-Ferguson exemption focused on the
interplay between state and federal law in the antitrust context. 90 CONG. REC. 6524-56
(1944); 91 CONG. REC. 479-80, 484, 486 (1945). Considerable concern was expressed over the
states' ability to preempt federal antitrust policy by the enactment of their own insurance
regulatory laws. 91 CONG. REc. 479 (1945) (remarks of Sens. Murdock & Ferguson). Once
the South-Eastern Underwriters decision was announced, the pressures on Congress to act
promptly increased because of the threat that many insurance companies would refuse to
pay'state taxes on the ground that such levies were burdens on interstate commerce. S. REP.
No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945); 91 CONG. REc. 484, 1087, 1092 (1945).
The Senate and House reports on the final bills both state that one purpose of the bill
was "tlo declare that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the
business of insurance is in the public interest." H.R. REP. No. 68, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1945); S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
31 There is some dispute over whether this language encompasses entities other than
insurance companies. See note 56 infra.
-2 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
3 This first step in McCarran-Ferguson analysis has never been a matter of serious
contention. Some plaintiffs have argued that the lack of an express omission of the insur-
ance industry from the scope of a particular statute is the same as an affirmative provision
that it "specifically relates" to insurance, but this argument has never been taken seriously.
See Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 464 (5th Cir. 1979).
The meaning of the phrase is illustrated by section 1014 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
itself. This section "specifically relates" the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair La-
bor Standards Act to the business of insurance. Id. at 464. The remarks of Senator Ferguson
also shed light on the meaning of the phrase:
If there is on the books of the United States a legislative act which relates to interstate
commerce, if the act does not specifically relate to insurance, it would not apply at the
present time. Having passed the bill now before the Senate, if Congress should to-
[48:730
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questions in the contexts of the Federal Truth in Lending Act and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
A. The Business of Insurance
The legislative history of the Act offers little guidance in inter-
preting the phrase "the business of insurance. ' I Although the- leg-
islative history indicates that "Congress' purpose was broadly to
give support to the existing and future state systems for regulating
and taxing the 'business of insurance,' ,,35 it fails to reveal exactly
what that term was intended to embrace.3 "
The Supreme Court's major pronouncement on the subject
provides a general interpretation of the term "business of insur-
ance," but it, too, fails to delineate its scope adequately. In SEC v.
National Securities, Inc.,3 7 the Court stated that in passing the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, "Congress was concerned with the type of
State regulation that centers around the contract of insur-
ance .... The relationship between insurer and insured, the type
of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and
enforcement-these were the core of the 'business of insurance.' "38
As examples, the Court cited such activities as the fixing of rates,
the selling and advertising of policies, and the licensing of com-
panies and their agents.3 9 In a recent decision involving the Mc-
morrow pass a law relating to interstate commerce and should not specifically apply
the law to the business of insurance, it would not be an implied repeal of this bill, and
this bill would not be affected, because the Congress had not, under subdivision (b),
said that the new law specifically applied to insurance.
91 CoNG. REc. 481 (1945).
3 See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458 (1968).
35 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1945).
36 One version of the legislation proposed by the NAIC enumerated specific practices,
that were to be exempted from federal regulation. This more specific form of the legislation
was rejected in favor of the generalized exemption language that was enacted. See Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 221-23 (1979).
37 393 U.S. 453 (1968). In this case, the Court addressed the SEC's power to regulate
the merger of two insurance companies. The Court held that the Act did not preclude the
application of rule 10b-5 disclosure requirements to this merger, noting that the case in-
volved questions concerning the relationship between a stockholder and the company in
which he holds stock rather than the insurance relationship which is at the core of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Commenting on the phrase "the business of insurance," the Court
stated that "whatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the focus
was-it was on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder. Stat-
utes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or indirectly, are laws regu-
lating the 'business of insurance."' Id. at 460.
8 Id. at 460.
39 Id.
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Carran-Ferguson Act, Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal
Drug Co.,4" the Court reaffirmed the delineation of the business of
insurance articulated in National Securities.41
1. Truth in Lending Cases. The Seventh Circuit, in Lowe v.
Aarco-American, Inc.,42 read the phrase "the business of insur-
ance" broadly. In that case, Aarco-American, an insurance broker,
and Fairway Acceptance Company, -a company that provided
premium financing 8 in connection with the sale of insurance poli-
cies, were accused of violating the disclosure requirements of the
Truth in Lending Act. The defendant companies moved to dismiss
the claim on the ground that they were engaged in the business of
insurance, an activity regulated by the state of Illinois, and conse-
quently that the application of the Truth in Lending Act to their
activities would supersede Illinois law in contravention of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act.44
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling in the de-
fendants' favor, holding that the credit sale of insurance policies
was an activity encompassed within the scope of the business of
insurance. The court stated that the business of insurance em-
braced "more than questions of the validity and enforceability of
insurance policies or the limits of policy coverages. '45 The court
reasoned that premium financing was similar to the setting of a
company's rate structure and thus included within the McCarran-
Ferguson exemption.46
40 440 U.S. 205 (1979). The Court held agreements between Blue Shield of Texas and
pharmacies to fix retail prices of drugs (so-called "provider agreements") not to be within
the scope of the business of insurance and thus not immune under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act from prosecution under the Sherman Act. Id. at 214-17.
41 Id. at 215-16. The dissenting Justices in Royal Drug felt that the majority opinion
,had unduly restricted the holding in National Securities. Id. at 233 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). It is noteworthy that this dissent was joined by Justice Marshall, who had written the
opinion for the Court in National Securities.
42 536 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1976).
43 Generally, a financed insurance policy is no different from a traditional insurance
arrangement, except that the insured party pays the premium for the policy in installments
over the life of the policy, and either the insurance company or an independent finance
company receives an interest payment over and above the insurance premium, in return for
advancing the funds to pay the premium. See Krischer, "Truth" in Insurance Premium
Financing, 30 Bus. LAw. 969, 971-72 (1975); Comment, Insurance Premium Financing, 19
BUFFALo L. REv. 656 (1970).
"" See 536 F.2d at 1161.
45 Id. at 1162.
46 Id. This argument was first articulated in Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp.
642 (S.D. Fla. 1972). The court in Gerlach granted the defendant insurance company sum-
mary judgment against the plaintiff's Truth in Lending Act claim on the ground that the
[48:730
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The Fifth Circuit, in a recent trilogy of cases involving the
Truth in Lending Act, departed sharply from the reasoning in
Lowe and offered a narrower interpretation of the term "business
of insurance. 4 7 In Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Insurance Co.,48 as
in Lowe, the defendant was accused of violating the disclosure re-
quirements of the Truth in Lending Act in connection with the
premium financing of insurance policies.49 The Perry court held
that premium financing by an insurance company did not consti-
tute the business of insurance within the meaning of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act;50  such financing activity was found to be
"purely ancillary to the insurance relationship between the insur-
ance company and the policyholder."' 5' The court considered an in-
surance company that offered premium financing as a sales induce-
ment to be involved in two distinct roles, one as a creditor and the
other as an insurer, and held that only in the insurer role was the
company entitled to the protection of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.52 Reasoning by analogy to antitrust cases involving the Act,5
3
insurance agreement was not a consumer credit transaction within the scope of the Act. Id.
at 648-49. In the alternative, the court found that Allstate's installment payment plan was
part of its rate structure and thus within the Supreme Court's definition of the business of
insurance in National Securities. Id. at 649; accord, Ben v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (D. Colo. 1974). Ben involved alleged violations of the Truth
in Lending Act and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1985 (1976), in the context
of an insurance policy required as an incident to a loan made by the General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation. But see Krischer, supra note 43, at 976 (criticizing Gerlach); Tennes-
see Comment, supra note 2, at 358 (same).
47 Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1979); Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins.
Co., 606 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2973 (1980); Cody v. Community
Loan Corp., 606 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2973 (1980). For commen-
tary taking the position that the general trend in cases interpreting the McCarran-Ferguson
Act is toward a narrower interpretation of this phrase, see Duke Comment, supra note 2;
George Washington Note, supra note 2; Tennessee Comment, supra note 2.
606 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2973 (1980).
4' See id. at 470. Although Perry involved an insurance company as defendant, rather
than an independent premium financing agency as in Lowe, the Fifth Circuit did not find
this distinction significant in its analysis. See also note 56 infra.
50 606 F.2d at 471. Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1979), involved a simi-
lar situation, except that the defendant was an independent premium finance company. In
direct opposition to Lowe, the Fifth Circuit held that premium financing" engaged in by an
independent premium financing agency was not within the business of insurance. Id. at 467.
In Cody v. Community Loan Corp., 606 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
2973 (1980), the defendant was a household loan company that also financed and sold cer-
tain types of insurance. The Fifth Circuit applied the same principles as in Cochran and
Perry, and concluded that the defendant's activities in Cody also were not within the busi-
ness of insurance. Id. at 503.
51 606 F.2d at 470.
52 Id.
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the court stated that any activity that was not "an integral part of
the insurance business" and "peculiar to the insurance industry"
was outside the scope of the business of insurance." The Fifth Cir-
cuit further noted, in Cochran v. Paco, Inc.,55 that it failed to see
how the type, reliability, interpretation, and enforcement of insur-
ance policies, the elements of the insurer-insured relationship iden-
tified by the Supreme Court in the National Securities case as the
core of the business of insurance, were "affected to any significant
extent by premium financing arrangements. '5 6
53 The opinions of both the majority in Cochran and the dissent in Perry utilize Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act cases from antitrust contexts as "guides for construing the-terms of
the statute" in nonantitrust cases. Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 463 (5th Cir. 1979);
Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1979) (Brown, C.J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2973 (1980). As the usage of the phrase the "business of insur-
ance" is similar in both the first and second sentences of section 1012(b), courts have tended
to assume that the interpretation of this phrase is readily transferable from an antitrust
context to a nonantitrust context.
606 F.2d at 470.
606 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 466. See also Krischer, supra note 43, at 976. The Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Cochran is not entirely consistent with its statement in Perry, however. Before concluding,
consistently with Perry, that premium financing is not within the business of insurance,
regardless of the nature of the defendant, 606 F.2d at 466-67, the Cochran court stated that
"we must keep in mind that Paco is not an insurance company," id. at 465. In a footnote,
the court added: "At the outset we reject Paco's argument that under National Securities
the McCarran Act exemption extends to people who are neither the insurance company nor
the insured." Id. at 465 n.13. Chief Judge Brown, who had concurred in Cochran, indicated
in his Perry dissent that the nature of the defendant was significant. Id. at 471, 484 n.35.
The two positions represent interpretations of the same phrase in National Securities:
"The statute did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all the activities of
insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons or companies who are subject to
state regulation, but to laws 'regulating the business of insurance."' SEC v. National Sec.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1968) (emphasis in original). Because National Securities held only
that noninsurance activities of insurance companies are not protected, the language of that
case, like the language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act itself, is not dispositive of this issue.
There appears to be little justification, however, for looking to an organization's formal
title or name as a basis for limiting the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to insurance
companies alone. In the past, there has been no question that other non-insurance company
parties such as agents and brokers have been included within the scope of the McCarran-
Ferguson immunity. See, e.g., Lowe v. Aarco-American, Inc., 536 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1976),
where the Seventh Circuit held that an insurance broker and an independent insurance
premium financing company were within the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption. See also
Bartholomew v. Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812, 816-17 (4th Cir. 1979) (chiro-
practors who were members of commission that reviewed chiropractor bills submitted to
insurance company for payment were, in that capacity, involved in the business of insur-
ance); Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, [1979-1] Trade Cas. 77,069 (9th Cir. 1979). But see Providence Wash. Ins.
Co., 89 F.T.C. 345, 358 (1977); Krischer, supra note 43, at 976.
There are, however, reasonable economic arguments, based on the nature of the specific
business transaction involved, that may support a distinction between an independent
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Chief Judge Brown, dissenting in Perry, embraced the more
expansive interpretation given to the scope of the business of in-
surance in Lowe. The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that premium financing was ancillary to the business of insur-
ance, because such financing serves as an inducement to purchase
insurance and is integrally related to the sale of the policy.5 7
Premium financing, the dissent therefore maintained, was an activ-
ity fully within the definition of the insurer-insured relationship
described by the Supreme Court in National Securities." Chief
Judge Brown further argued that the Fifth Circuit's finding that
premium financing was not an activity peculiar to the insurance
industry was based on a misinterpretation of the "peculiar activ-
ity" standard used in the antitrust cases cited by the majority.59
He noted that the majority's failure to characterize premium
financing as an activity peculiar to the insurance industry would,
by implication, leave a whole range of activities, such as rate mak-
ing and advertising, outside the scope of the business of
insurance.60
premium financing agency and other non-insurance company parties such as insurance
agents. When a premium finance company is involved, the insurer does not bear the risk of
nonpayment. The premium typically is prepaid at periodic intervals or paid in full at the
outset of the policy period. If the insured defaults, the premium fimancer has an action
against the insured, but the insurance company itself would have no interest in the matter.
Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1979) (Brown, C.J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2973 (1980). Thus it can be argued that an independent premi-
um finance company is far less involved in the relationship between insurer and insured
than, for example, insurance agents. See Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 345 (1977).
17 606 F.2d at 476. Chief Judge Brown noted that premium financing is analogous to
advertising in terms of its role in the insurer-insured relationship. Although he did not cite
FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1957), that case had held advertising to be within
the business of insurance.
Further, the dissent stated that premium financing is more than a convenience. If poor
consumers of insurance were required to seek outside sources such as banks or consumer
finance companies for loans to cover the purchase of a policy, the interest rate would be
significantly, if not prohibitively, higher. 606 F.2d at 477; accord, Comment, supra note 43,
at 659-60.
58 606 F.2d at 478.
, See id. at 476. An earlier case, American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Mktg.
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1974), had used the phrase "not peculiar" to mean the
same thing as the Supreme Court's "peculiar" standard in National Securities.
10 606 F.2d at 476. The Fifth Circuit's position implicitly conflicts with such cases as
FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1957) (per curiam), where the Court held that the
FTC did not have authority to regulate the advertising practices of insurance companies in
those states that regulated such practices under their own laws. Under the Fifth Circuit's
analysis, National Casualty would be acting like an advertiser when it engaged in such types
of promotional activities, and, contrary to the Supreme Court's decision, such activities
would not be within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption.
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It is unclear whether interpretations of the scope of the busi-
ness of insurance in the antitrust context can be fully applied, as
in Perry, to nonantitrust cases. Recently, in Group Life & Health
Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,"1 the Supreme Court stated that
the McCarran-Ferguson Act's primary purpose was to preserve
state regulation of insurance companies and that the antitrust as-
pects of the legislation were only a secondary purpose of the Act. 2
The Court's relegation of the antitrust exemption to a secondary
purpose casts doubt upon the use of antitrust cases to interpret
nonantitrust cases.63 Moreover, the Court has consistently adhered
to the principle that both explicit and implicit exemptions from
the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed. 4 Consequently,
reasoning by analogy to antitrust cases to construe the McCarran-
Ferguson Act in Truth in Lending and Title VII cases may lead to
a more restrictive interpretation of the statute's grant of immunity
than Congress intended. "
It is clear, however, that activities included within the scope of
the business of insurance in the antitrust context should also be so
included outside that setting. These antitrust precedents confirm
the finding of the Seventh Circuit and Chief Judge Brown that
premium financing is within the scope of the business of insurance.
Different forms of tying arrangements, similar to financing agree-
ments in that they are a means of inducing the purchase of an
insurance policy,66 have been held to be within the scope of the
61 440 U.S. 205 (1979); see note 40 supra.
62 The Court stated:
There is no question that the primary purpose of the 'McCarran-Ferguson Act was to
preserve state regulation of the activities of insurance companies, as it existed before
the South-Eastern Underwriters case .... The McCarran-Ferguson Act operates to
assure that the States are free to regulate insurance companies without fear of Com-
merce Clause attack. The question in the present case, however, is one under the quite
different secondary purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act-to give insurance compa-
nies only a limited exemption from the antitrust laws.
440 U.S. at 218 n.18 (emphasis in original).
63 See Columbia Note, supra note 2, at 1484.
E.g., 440 U.S. at 231.
65 Principles of statutory construction suggest that the phrase "business of insurance"
should be interpreted similarly in both antitrust and other contexts. See note 53 supra. Yet
to the extent that courts have construed the phrase narrowly in antitrust cases to reflect the
policies underlying the antitrust laws, see text and note at note 63 supra, such a limited
reading should not be applied to nonantitrust contexts.
66 See Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1979) (Brown,
C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2973 (1980). But see the Fifth Circuit's rejection of
this theory, id. at 470 n.6 (distinguishing "required" from "voluntary" financing arrange-
ments). Tying arrangements may also be subject to the Sherman Act under section 3 of the
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business of insurance.e7 The promotional activities of insurance
companies68 and the relationship between insurance companies
and their agents, 69 both enabling links, like premium financing, in
the relationship between insurer and insured, also have been held
within the scope of the "business of insurance."
The business of insurance logically encompasses the full range
of activities involved in an insurance relationship. In holding that
an insurance company that finances the sales of its policies is act-
ing as a creditor rather than an insurer and thus is not entitled to
the immunity granted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Fifth
Circuit has adopted an unjustifiably narrow perspective 70 that ig-
nores the broad scope of activities held by prior decisions to be
within the business of insurance.
2. Title VII Cases. The conflict over the scope of the busi-
ness of insurance is further illustrated by two recent cases involv-
ing claims made under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
these cases, the Teacher's Insurance and Annuity Association
("TIAA") and College Retirement Equities Fund ("CREF") were
sued for alleged sex discrimination. The suits challenged the use of
sex-segregated tables in determining annuity benefits as a violation
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1976) (rendering the McCarran-Ferguson Act
inapplicable to any "agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate"). Certain forms of tying
arrangements have been so prosecuted by the Justice Department. See, e.g., United States
v. Investors Diversified Servs., [1954] Trade Cas. 69,574 (D.C. Minn. 1954).
'7 Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 527 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1975); Addrisi v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929
(1975); McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Mathis v.
Auto Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1976). See also Annot., 33 A.L.R.
Fed. 608 (1977).
68 SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1968); FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357
U.S. 560 (1958).
69 SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1968); Card v. National Life Ins. Co.,
603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979); Steinberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 486 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); Black v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Pa. 1977); cf. Zelson v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 549 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1977) (insurer-agent relationship protected
to extent it affects insurer-insured relationship). But see American Family Life Assurance
Co. v. Planned Mktg. Co., 389 F. Supp. 1141, 1146-47 (E.D. Va. 1974). While the lower
courts are in general agreement, the Supreme Court recently has reserved judgment on
whether "transactions between an insurer and its agents, including independent agents, are
the 'business of insurance."' Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
224 n.32 (1979).
70 As the Supreme Court stated in interpreting a different section of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, "[w]hile the legislative history does not point unambiguously to the answer, it
provides no substantial support for limiting language that Congress itself chose not to
limit." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 550 (1977).
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of both Title VI 1' and the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. In both cases, the defendant TIAA asserted
that the application of Title VII was barred by the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act.
In the first case, Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Asso-
ciation,7 12 the court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act pre-
cluded the application of Title VII to TIAA.7 3 The court found
that the challenged activity, the use of sex-segregated mortality ta-
bles in the computation of annuity benefits, was an integral aspect
of the insurer-insured relationship and thus squarely within the
scope of the business of insurance as defined by the Supreme
Court in National Securities.7 4 The court further found that New
York State had "pervasively regulated the subject of discrimina-
tion between policyholders 7 5 and, consequently, the application of
Title VII would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" New York law. 8
7 Although Title VII makes only discriminatory practices of an employer unlawful,
courts have found Title VII to be applicable to TIAA-CREF. The remedial purpose of the
statute, see Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), remanded, No. 79-7715 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1981), the degree of involvement TIAA-
CREF has in the employer's activities, see Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 1343,
1350 (E.D. Mich. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1670 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 1979), and the
necessity of such an extension of Title VII's reach to avoid frustration of its purposes by an
employer's delegation of such authority, Spirt, 475 F. Supp. at 1308, have all been given as
reasons for holding TIAA-CREF to be an employer within the meaning of Title VII.
712 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), remanded, No. 79-7715 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1981).
73 The court first noted that Title VII did not specifically refer to insurance. Id. at
1301. Because TIAA was a fixed-annuity company and thus subject to investment risk, its
activities were held to be within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 1303.
On the other hand, the Spirt court held that this immunity was unavailable to CREF,
because CREF was a variable-annuity company. Under the rationale of SEC v. Variable
.Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959), such companies were not insurance companies within the
meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 475 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
74 475 F. Supp. at 1302.
75 Id. at 1303-04. New York had enacted a comprehensive insurance code. In particular,
section 209 of the New York code, N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 1-631 (McKinney 1966), provided
that no life insurance company doing business in the state could make or permit any unfair
discrimination between individuals of the same class and of equal expectations of life in
premiums, rates, dividends, or benefits of policies.
76 Id. See also text and notes at notes 88-118 infra. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was
not raised as a defense to the equal protection claims raised in Spirt under sections 1983
and 1985(3). Both these claims failed for lack of the required state action. 475 F. Supp. at
1313, 1315.
Equal protection claims under sections 1982 and 1985 also were raised in Ben v. Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 1974). The plaintiff in Ben al-
leged that she had been placed in a high-risk auto insurance category solely because she was
a Navajo Indian. The court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar these claims.
The holding was based on peculiar reasoning. The court found that the differences in back-
ground and history between the Civil Rights Acts and the McCarran-Ferguson Act demon-
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In Peters v. Wayne State University," a case involving issues
similar to those raised in Spirt, the court rejected the claim of Mc-
Carran-Ferguson immunity raised by TIAA in a posttrial brief.7 8
The court asserted that TIAA did not have an investment risk (a
necessary condition for insurance company status),7 a conclusion
unsupported by any evaluation of the nature of TIAA's actual bus-
iness.80 The court also found that TIAA was not in the business of
insurance because TIAA was "so intertwined" with the institutions
it served that it more closely resembled an employer than an insur-
ance company.8 1
The Peters decision is a puzzling departure from precedent.
There is no basis for the court's statement that TIAA does not
have an investment risk. It is a well-established principle that the
"primary elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and
underwriting of a policyholder's risk."'82 The fixed annuity con-
tracts sold by TIAA perform precisely that function.83 The guaran-
teed future payment received by a TIAA annuitant is precisely the
"guarantee of fixed income" involving "some investment risk tak-
ing on the part of the company" that the Supreme Court has held
strated that Congress "in enacting the McCarran Act had no intent to deny access to the
Federal Courts for redress for violations of a person's civil rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution." Id. at 1202. Although serious constitutional conflicts may be raised by an
attempt to immunize insurance companies against claims under the fourteenth amendment
(as implemented by the damage remedy of the Civil Rights Acts) by means of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act, the language of the Act implies such an immunity. The court in Ben
appears to have avoided this serious conflict by employing the simple, but hardly tenable,
rationale that because there is no indication that Congress intended McCarran-Ferguson to
provide such a broad immunity, the language of the Act alone cannot be construed to reach
such a result, id. at 1203.
77 476 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Mich. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1670 (6th Cir. Dec. 13,
1979).
78 Id. at 1350.
79 The Supreme Court has interpreted the word "insurance" under the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act to require some investment risk on the part of the insurance company. SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959). See also note 73 supra.
80 See 476 F. Supp. at 1351.
81 Id. The court found it relevant that the contribution to TIAA's annuity plans was
the mandatory subject of collective bargaining in many instances. Id.
'2 Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979); accord, SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1959).
88 The annuitant pays to the company a set yearly fee in exchange for the company's
promise to pay the annuitant a guaranteed annuity once he reaches a specified age. EEOC v.
Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1141 (1st Cir. 1978). If the company calculates correctly, the
premiums paid by the policyholders whose deaths occur earlier than predicted by actuarial
statistics help pay the benefits of those who live longer. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 239 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to be the crucial element of an insurance contract.84
The finding of the Peters court that TIAA is closely inter-
twined with the institutions it serves is irrelevant to whether TIAA
is in the business of insurance for purposes of the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act. There is neither precedent nor legislative history indi-
cating that a party otherwise engaged in the business of insurance
loses that status when its relationship with its insured arises as the
result of a three-way agreement between the insured, the insured's
employer, and the insurance company. 5
Because both the plain language of the statute and the rele-
vant case law clearly encompass a situation such as Peters,86 the
court's rejection of McCarran-Ferguson immunity may represent a
conclusion that the policies behind Title VII should not be
thwarted by recognition of the McCarran-Ferguson Act defense.8
84 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959). See also Mearns, The
Commission, the Variable Annuity and the Inconsiderate Sovereign, 45 VA. L. REv. 831,
840 (1959) (noting that the mortality risk inherent in a variable annuity contract might
justify treating the annuity company as an insurer).
85 There is, however, precedent for the contrary proposition. See, e.g., Ackerman-Chil-
lingworth Div. of Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 405 F. Supp.
99 (D. Hawaii 1975) (arrangement involving group insurance plan as element of the contract
between various electrical contractors and unions; the insurance company was exempted
from Sherman Act liability by the McCarran-Ferguson Act), aff'd, 579 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
8 But see Case Comment, 68 GEo. L.J. 1285 (1980), arguing that Title VII can be
deemed applicable to insurers, despite the McCarran-Ferguson Act, either on the theory
that Title VII specifically relates to the business of insurance or by construing Title VII
impliedly to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Neither of these arguments is persuasive. The Arbitration Act cases, see text and notes
at notes 97-102 infra, reject the theory that a law of general applicability specifically relates
to the business of insurance within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. More fun-
damentay, if the "specifically relates" inquiry is to turn on the "pervasive scope" of the
federal legislation, see Case Comment, supra, at 1293, one might argue that federal antitrust
laws specifically relate to the insurance industry. Such a result is clearly contrary to the
intent of the McCarran-Ferguson Act framers.
The implied repeal cases relied on by the commentator, id. at 1294 n.90, themselves
argue against application of the doctrine in this situation. For example, in TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978), the court repeats the "cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not
favored." Rather, "the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest." Id.
at 189.
87 The court in Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. MidAm. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106
(S.D. Ohio 1979), engages in a similar process, but with greater candor. In Dunn, the defen-
dant insurance company sought to interpose a McCarran-Ferguson Act defense to the plain-
tiff's charge that insurance redlining by the defendant was a violation of the Fair Housing
Act. Id. at 1111. The court rejected this defense, stating simply that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act was not intended to address the problem of insurance redlining and hence was inappli-
cable. Id. at 1112. See also Ben v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D.
Colo. 1974).
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B. Invalidate, Impair, or Supersede
The second part of the McCarran-Ferguson Act inquiry re-
quires that a court ask whether application of the federal statutes,
to the challenged activity would "invalidate, impair, or supersede"
any state law enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance." 89 This raises at least two major questions of statu-
tory interpretation:90 first, which state laws are those enacted for
the purpose of regulating the insurance industry, and second, how
exacting a scrutiny of the relevant state law is mandated by the
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" requirement. The legislative his-
tory of the Act provides no guidance on either question.
The Truth in Lending Act and Title VII cases that have
reached this second inquiry have, without substantial discussion,
consistently looked to the relevant state insurance codes as the
source of laws enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance."9 1 Courts have differed more significantly in their un-
derstanding of the "invalidate, impair, or supersede" requirement.
Although the majority of cases have looked to specific state provi-
sions that would be so affected by application of the federal stat-
ute,92 some courts also have implied that pervasive regulation of
the insurance industry might bar application of federal law even if
no state regulation specifically addressed the challenged activity. 3
This reasoning, apparently derived from judicial interpretations of
" If the federal statute "specifically relates to the business of insurance," 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (1976), McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity is unavailable. For further discussion
of which federal statutes "specifically relate" to the insurance industry, see note 7 supra.
$9 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976); see note 1 supra.
90 There also is some dispute about whether the state law enacted must be "effective."
See Tulane Comment, supra note 2, at 1074-76. See also FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S.
560, 564-65 (1958); Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 548 F.2d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1977);
Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1180-84 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 917 (1972); Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657, 667-68 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, [1979-1] Trade Cas. 77,069 (9th Cir. 1979).
91 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). See Lowe v. Aarco-American, Inc., 536 F.2d 1160, 1162
(7th Cir. 1976); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1303-04
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), remanded, No. 79-7715 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1981); Ben v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (D. Colo. 1974); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338
F. Supp. 642, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
" E.g., Lowe v. Aarco-American, Inc., 536 F.2d 1160, 1161-62 (7th Cir. 1976); Spirt v.
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), remanded, No. 79-
7715 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1981); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642, 650 (S.D. Fla.
1972).
93 E.g., Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), remanded, No. 79-7715 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1981); Ben v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (D. Colo. 1974).
1981]
The University of Chicago Law Review
the separate proviso of section 1012(b) that applies in the antitrust
context,94 can lead to a more pervasive grant of immunity from
federal law than is justified by the language of the Act.
This section first addresses the issue of which state laws are
enacted for the "purpose of regulating the business of insurance";
it then proceeds to analyze the level of judicial scrutiny that is
consistent with the "invalidate, impair, or supersede" requirement.
In each instance, the judicial interpretation of the main clause of
section 1012(b) is contrasted with the interpretation given to the
antitrust proviso that also is contained in that section.
1. State Laws Enacted for the Purpose of Regulating the
Business of Insurance. The Supreme Court held in SEC v. Na-
tional Securities, Inc.95 that only those state laws intended to reg-
ulate, either directly or indirectly, the insurer-insured relationship
trigger McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity.9 This statement fails
to resolve whether such laws must be part of a state's insurance
code or whether state law of general applicability will suffice. For
instance, one must determine whether a state premium financing
law, not specifically incorporated into a scheme of insurance regu-
lation, would be equivalent to a law enacted for the express pur-
pose of regulating the business of insurance.
One line of cases, involving claims of McCarran-Ferguson Act
immunity from the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act,9 7
has found state arbitration codes of general applicability insuffi-
cient to justify the immunity. Both the Second98 and Tenth99 Cir-
cuits reasoned that the state arbitration codes at issue did not reg-
ulate the business of insurance; rather, "they are laws of general
applicability pertaining to the method of handling contract dis-
putes." 100 In the most recent of the Arbitration Act cases, the Fifth
Circuit stated simply that "[a]n examination of the [Georgia] in-
surance code reveals that it has no provision concerning arbitration
clauses."10' The court did not discuss whether Georgia had any ar-
bitration statute of general applicability that might justify the im-
9, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976); see note 1 supra.
95 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
96 Id. at 460.
9- 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
98 Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.
1969).
11 Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1971).
100 Id. at 1360.
"01 Miller v. National Security Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1979).
[48:730
McCarran-Ferguson Act Immunity
munity; its citation of the earlier cases decided by the Tenth and
Second Circuits11 2 indicates, however, that the existence of such a
general statute would not have altered the court's ruling. The Ar-
bitration Act cases suggest that only laws embodied in the state's
insurance code are relevant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act inquiry.
The Truth in Lending Act cases that have reached the "invali-
date, impair, or supersede" requirement'0 3 also have looked to the
states' insurance codes as the source of relevant potential conflict.
In Gerlach v. Allstate Insurance Co., 04 the district court relied on
Florida's regulation, within its insurance code, of both the fixing of
insurance rates and the regulation of insurance premium financ-
ing.'0 5 Similarly, in Lowe v. Aarco-American, Inc.,106 the Seventh
Circuit found that Illinois regulated both insurance rates and
premium financing under its insurance code.'0 7 Finally, in Ben v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp.,08 the District Court of Colo-
rado concluded that the Truth in Lending Act was inapplicable be-
cause "Colorado ha[d] occupied the field of regulating the activi-
ties of insurance companies, in a comprehensive manner."'109
In Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association,"° the
defendants claimed that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempted
them from Title VII's prohibition of sex-segregated mortality ta-
bles in the computation of annuity benefits. The court found the
comprehensive scheme of insurance regulation in New York to "ev-
idence a legislative belief that discrimination on the basis of sex in
the rates and benefits of annuity contracts is not unlawful."'
TIAA's claim that the McCarran-Ferguson Act provided immunity
from Title VII therefore was upheld.""
102 Id.
103 Lowe v. Aarco-American, Inc., 536 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1976); Ben v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 1974); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F.
Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
104 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
105 Id. at 650. The Gerlach opinion, however, contains a lengthy quotation from Califor-
nia League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D.
Cal. 1959), where the court had premised its finding of McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity in
part on the state's general antitrust laws. Id. at 860.
206 536 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1976).
107 Id. at 1161-62.
108 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 1974).
109 Id. at 1201.
110 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), remanded, No. 79-7715 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1981).
m Id. at 1304.
111 The Spirt court noted in particular section 209 of the New York Insurance Law,
which provides that "no life insurance company doing business in the state shall make or
19811
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In contrast to the interpretation of the main clause of section
1012(b), courts construing the antitrust proviso of that section
have looked to a variety of state laws, including some outside the
relevant insurance codes. They have referred to state laws prohib-
iting unfair practices in general,11 laws prohibiting illegal restraint
of trade,1 4 laws regulating state health care plans,"5 and state an-
titrust laws.11 What these statutes have in common is an obvious
impact on the same activities that are regulated by federal anti-
trust legislation. If a state clearly has regulated an activity such as
sex-based discrimination or interest disclosure requirements
through its general statutory scheme, however, and if these laws
are in fact applied to the insurance industry, there is no principled
reason why they should not satisfy the requirement of laws passed
"for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. 11 7
Such general laws are part of a state's regulation of the in-
surer-insured relationship, and basing McCarran-Ferguson Act im-
munity on them does not threaten to extend the immunity beyond
the scope envisioned by the Act's framers. In principle, therefore,
the antitrust precedent might be more applicable to determining
which laws regulate the business of insurance than courts constru-
ing the "invalidate, impair, or supersede" requirement have ac-
knowledged. The antitrust proviso analogy that does threaten to
expand the immunity beyond reasonable bounds is that interpret-
ing the "to the extent" language of the proviso." 8
2. State Laws That Would Be "Invalidated, Impaired, or
Superseded" by Application of Federal Law. The principal issue
that has arisen in determining whether federal law would "invali-
date, impair, or supersede" state law is whether a pervasive scheme
permit any unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class and of equal expec-
tation of life in premiums, rates, dividends or benefits of policies for life insurance or annui-
ties," N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 209 (McKinney 1966). The court interpreted this provision to
proscribe discrimination between individuals of the same class but to permit discrimination
among classes or groups presenting different insurance risks. 475 F. Supp. at 1303. The
court also relied on sections 159(1)(d) and 160(c), which implicitly permit gender to be a
factor in setting annuity rates and benefits. Id. at 1304.
13 See Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerican Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 83 (10th
Cir. 1973).
See id.
"' See Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657, 668 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, [1979-1] Trade Cas. 77,069 (9th Cir. 1979).
1 See California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175
F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976); see note 1 supra.
1 See note 1 supra.
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of state insurance regulation so occupies the field that no federal
law can be deemed applicable to the business of insurance without
superseding the state law.119 The majority of courts that have con-
strued the main clause have rested their holdings on a careful scru-
tiny of state law regulating the specific activity in question. 120 At
least two courts, however, have suggested that comprehensive state
regulation of the insurance industry does automatically give rise to
McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity.12 1 One of the courts maintains
that such a reading of the "invalidate, impair, or supersede" re-
quirement is supported by precedent interpreting the antitrust
proviso of section 1012(b). 22 Such a broad exemption, however, is
not supported by the language of the Act or by the antitrust
precedent.
The use of the three terms, "invalidate," "impair," and "su-
persede," clearly prohibits a court from applying federal law when
"' Part of the difficulty in interpreting this main clause of section 1012(b) is the stat-
ute's ambiguity with respect to the relationship between that clause and the antitrust pro-
viso that follows it.
The main clause of section 1012(b), the "invalidate" language dealing with nonantitrust
contexts, may be read to grant a substantially broader protection to state law than the pro-
viso of section 1012(b), which refers solely to the antitrust context. State law regulating the
insurance industry may be viewed as applicable in the antitrust context only to the extent
that it regulates the activity in question, leaving subject to federal law activities that are
either unregulated or that could be regulated to a greater degree than state law provides.
Acts of Congress in nonantitrust areas, however, would seem to be inapplicable whenever
the state had regulated the activity in question, in that any federal law that required com-
pliance above the standard dictated by federal law would "supersede" the state law. See,
e.g., Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468, 483 (5th Cir. 1979) (Brown, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2973 (1980).
Alternatively, the main clause and the antitrust proviso may be read as providing essen-
tially the same degree of protection for state law. There is no obvious reason why the "inval-
idate" language of the main clause of section 1012(b) should not apply in the antitrust con-
text as well, despite the general judicial tendency to regard those two clauses as
independent. See Weller, supra note 23, at 602-06. Such an interpretation leaves state law
in both the antitrust and nonantitrust areas protected by the full scope of the first clause of
section 1012(b), with the second clause serving to reiterate what is implicit in the main
clause: that any gap in state regulation in the antitrust area should be filled by existing
federal law. See, e.g., Lawyer's Title Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 795, 797 (8th
Cir. 1975) (in which the defendant argued that Missouri law would be "invalidated, im-
paired, or superseded" by application of the Sherman and Clayton Acts).
"10 Lowe v. Aarco-American, Inc., 536 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1976); Spirt v. Teachers Ins.
& Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), remanded, No. 79-7715 (2d Cir. Feb.
19, 1981); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
121 Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
remanded, No. 79-7715 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1981); Ben v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
374 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (D. Colo., 1974).
123 Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
remanded, No. 79-7715 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1981).
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the statute regulates the specific activity in a different manner or
to a different degree than the federal statute. Even if a state has a
broad scheme of insurance regulation, however, it may not have
enacted legislation pertinent to the specific activity challenged by
federal law. In this case, a court that automatically invokes McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act immunity must either be ignoring the "invali-
date, impair, or supersede" requirement or be reasoning that the
state intended to permit all activity not explicitly addressed in its
code. It is this latter interpretation that looks to the antitrust pre-
cedent for support. It is important, therefore, to understand the
judicial interpretation of the antitrust proviso's limitation that fed-
eral antitrust law is applicable only "to the extent that [the insur-
ance] business is not regulated by State Law."1 23
Courts construing the antitrust proviso frequently have made
broad statements to the effect that "a State regulates the business
of insurance within the meaning of § 1012(b) when a State statute
generally proscribes . . . or permits or authorizes certain conduct
on the part of the insurance companies. ' 124 Such a broad exemp-
tion might be justified in the antitrust-but not the Truth in
Lending or Title VII-context on the ground that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was passed primarily in response to the threat that
federal antitrust laws would be applied to the insurance
industry.125
In fact, however, the courts making such broad statements
have conducted a far more particularized inquiry into state law
than their broad language would indicate. Some courts have stated,
for example, that a general scheme of state regulation of a particu-
lar kind of insurance, such as title'2 6 or automobile liability127 in-
surance, would be sufficient to invoke McCarran-Ferguson Act im-
munity. These courts have, however, pointed to specific provisions
123 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976); see note 1 supra.
124 California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F.
Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959); accord, FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958).
See also Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 218 (5th Cir. 1975); Commander
Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 84 (10th Cir. 1973); Ohio AFL-CIO
v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917
(1972).
125 See text and notes at notes 8-20 supra.
126 Lawyers Title Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1975); Craw-
ford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1975); Commander Leasing
Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 83 (10th Cir. 1973).
127 Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972).
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of the state code that at least implicitly regulated the challenged
conduct."' 8 They often have buttressed their holdings by reference
to state unfair practices statutes,2 9 state antitrust laws, 1s0 or, in
one case, to a state law regulating health care plans, a1 that also
regulated the challenged conduct. Despite broad language to the
contrary, therefore, courts construing the "to the extent" limita-
tion of the proviso have examined the scheme of state regulation
for provisions applicable to the activity challenged by federal
law.1 3 2
The reliance of courts construing the main clause of section
1012(b) on the broad language of the antitrust cases rather than on
the particularized inquiry that supported those courts' holdings
leads to results that are unsupported by the statutory language.
For example, in Ben v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,133 the
court was satisfied that McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity should
attach merely because Colorado had regulated insurance compa-
nies in a pervasive manner,13 4 without examining that state's insur-
128 Lawyers Title Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1975); Ohio
AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 917 (1972); California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
12 See, e.g., Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 83
(10th Cir. 1973).
"0 See Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657, 668 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, [1979-1] Trade Cas. 77,069 (9th Cir. 1979); California League of
Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal.
1959).
"I See Manasen v. California Dental Servs., 424 F. Supp. 657, 668 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, [1979-1] Trade Cas. 77,069 (9th Cir. 1979).
1M, In United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. I1. 1965), the
court found McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity unavailable to defendants who had allegedly
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act by engaging in a stock acquisition that had the effect
of lessening competition. Id. at 60. The court found that the state antitrust law did not
regulate this activity and stated, "[i]f federal legislation is to be displaced by state regula-
tion, the latter must cover the same ground as the federal legislation." Id. at 57. On its face,
this case exemplifies a greater degree of scrutiny than that applied by courts that have
rested their holdings in part on the mere existence of state antitrust regulation, see text and
note at note 138 supra. Chicago Title is a curious case, however, because the court failed to
discuss whether any aspect of the state's insurance code would justify McCarran-Ferguson
Act immunity.
The Eighth Circuit, however, in Lawyers Title Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 526 F.2d
795 (8th Cir. 1975), was careful to state that its finding of immunity was consistent with
Chicago Title. Id. at 797. Earlier in its opinion the Lawyers Title court had noted, 526 F.2d
at 797, the "broad scope" of McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity, see text and note at note
128 supra.
"1 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 1974).
134 Id. at 1201.
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ance code for any specifically applicable regulation. Such an ap-
proach threatens to expand the McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity
beyond that mandated by the "invalidate, impair, or supersede"
clause.
3. Summary. Courts construing the "invalidate, impair, or
supersede" clause have looked to the state insurance code as the
pertinent source of state regulation, and most have required that
the state specifically regulate the challenged activity for McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act immunity to be upheld. Although the courts
might, consistent with the statutory language, also look to general
state law applicable to insurers, their failure to do so has not af-
fected their holdings because the requisite state regulation was
found in the insurance codes. More disturbing is the willingness of
some courts to premise McCarran-Ferguson immunity on a perva-
sive scheme of state regulation without inquiring whether the state
code touches the specific activity in question. Such a broad grant
of immunity is inconsistent with the language of section 1012(b).
It is by no means clear, therefore, that all courts properly un-
derstand the scope of the inquiry that the "invalidate, impair, or
supersede" language requires. Even if courts confine their inquiry
as the statute requires, however, it is possible that federal legisla-
tion will be deemed inapplicable in situations where policy would
dictate against recognition of the immunity.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
It is a truism that the "starting point in any case involving the
construction of a statute is the language of the statute itself."1 5
The language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act unambiguously
grants the insurance industry a broad immunity from federal regu-
lation.13 6 On the other hand, both the Truth in Lending Act and
Title VII represent strong congressional statements of public pol-
icy. Reconciling the McCarran-Ferguson Act with the federal inter-
ests underlying these statutes may be impossible given the present
form of these statutes.
The Truth in Lending Act embodies two congressional judg-
ments. The first is that disclosure of credit policies is in the public
interest. The second is that one system of minimal disclosure re-
135 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541 (1978).




quirements should be uniformly applied to the fifty states.137 Un-
like federal antitrust legislation, application of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act to the insurance industry does not impinge on business
practices intrinsic and essential to insurers.3 8 On its face, the
Truth in Lending Act has no greater impact on the insurance in-
dustry than on any other nationwide business that utilizes credit.
Unless a particular impact is demonstrated, it does not appear es-
sential either that insurers be exempt from disclosure require-
ments or that such regulation be framed by the legislative body
most familiar with the state's insurance code. Because insurers
have no principled reason to prefer state to federal regulation of
their credit disclosure procedures, the congressional judgment in
favor of one uniform standard should prevail.3 9
The case against McCarran-Ferguson immunity from Title VII
is even more compelling.140 Title VII, and the federal policy against
discrimination embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is a mat-
ter of "highest priority. 141 Federal antidiscrimination legislation
was specifically designed to augment state legislation and establish
a supplementary regime of federal standards and supervision. 42
Judicial interpretation of Title VII has determined that discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex as to employment benefits and contribu-
tions is among the activities that Congress chose to prohibit. 43
Even if one were to argue, therefore, that such discrimination is
"intrinsic" to the insurance industry, Title VII represents a con-
gressional judgment that the practice is undesirable. There is no
reason why insurers who issue annuity policies should be allowed
to engage in sex-based discrimination while others offering annui-
ties are prohibited from doing so. In fact, as an industry with a
significant nationwide impact, insurers may even be the subject of
3"7 The purposes of the uniform federal credit requirements embodied in the Truth in
Lending Act were to eliminate consumer confusion and permit easy comparison of commer-
cial alternatives. See Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437, 441 (3d Cir.
1977); Hickman v. Cliff Peck Chevrolet, Inc., 566 F.2d 44, 46 (8th Cir. 1977).
1 Rate making and information sharing by insurers were threatened by the applica-
tion of federal antitrust laws. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.
205, 221 (1979).
139 As most insurance companies are active in interstate commerce, the insurance in-
dustry, like any other nationwide industry, has an interest in the uniformity of credit regu-
lation among the various states.
140 This case would be equally compelling in matters arising under other antidis-
crimination legislation.
141 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1973).
14 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).
143 See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710-12 (1978).
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a particularized federal interest.
Neither the Truth in Lending Act nor Title VII is specifically
made applicable to the insurance industry. By construing the
phrases "business of insurance" and "invalidate, impair, or super-
sede" narrowly,14 courts can eliminate some potential conflicts be-
tween those strong federal policies and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. There is a fine line, however, between narrowly construing
those phrases and manipulating the statutory language to achieve
a result that is desirable from a particular viewpoint of public pol-
icy.1 46 Such manipulation is an undesirable exercise of judicial
discretion.
As the McCarran-Ferguson Act currently stands, it has gener-
ated conflict in the case law both because of legitimate uncertainty
about the scope of immunity envisioned by the Act's framers and
because of judicial displeasure with the policy implications of fully
recognizing the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption. It is unlikely
that Congress originally considered the full effect that the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act could have in nonantitrust contexts such as the
Truth in Lending Act and Title VII. If this is indeed the case, it is
up to Congress to remedy the situation. 46 The failure of Congress
to act can result in judicial interpretations of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act that are at odds with the plain language of the statute.
CONCLUSION
This comment has shown that the scope of the immunity
granted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act in contexts such as the
Truth in Lending Act and Title VII has been misunderstood by
courts and, at times, impermissibly restricted to achieve policy-ori-
144 See text and notes at notes 34-87 supra.
1'5 Decisions such as Perry, Peters, and Cochran avoided conflict with the federal law
by reading the phrase "business of insurance" too narrowly. See text and notes at notes 47-
60, 77-87 supra. It is arguable that the cases construing the Act's immunity from the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act similarly misinterpreted the "invalidate, impair, or supersede" require-
ment by failing to premise immunity on the existence of state arbitration laws, see text and
notes at notes 86, 97-102 supra.
Cases such as Dunn and Ben, which relied on a more explicit balancing of the compet-
ing statutory interests, see text and notes at notes 76, 87 supra, represent a different, but no
more desirable, means of manipulating the statute.
14' See text and note at note 7 supra. If McCarran-Ferguson immunity from Title VII
and- the Truth in Lending Act is consistent with congressional intent, those two statutes
should be amended to make the exemption explicit. Although one would not normally ex-
pect Congress to address the status of the insurance industry in a statute of general applica-
bility, the degree of confusion exhibited by recent case law may make such action necessary.
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ented results. The legislative history of the Act and judicial prece-
dents require a broader interpretation of the phrase "business of
insurance" than some recent case law has allowed. The majority of
those courts that have reached the issue of whether a federal stat-
ute "invalidates, impairs, or supersedes" a state law have properly
conducted the inquiry required by the Act. Some courts, however,
have misapplied precedent from the antitrust context in con-
ducting this inquiry.
It is Congress, and not the courts, therefore, that bears the
burden of clarifying the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act ex-
emption and harmonizing that statute's grant of immunity with
the federal policies expressed in the Truth in Lending Act and Ti-
tle VII.
Steven Koch
